Continuity and Inheritance: Kant's Critique of Judgment and the Work of C.S. Peirce

I. Revisiting Peirce's Kantian Inheritance

"When I was a babe in philosophy," Charles Peirce wrote, "my bottle was filled from the udders of Kant."¹ It is widely recognized that this early form of philosophic nourishment granted young Peirce the opportunity to recognize the respective shortcomings of empiricism and idealism and provided the point of departure for his philosophic architectonic. Peirce himself comments on this indebtedness to Immanuel Kant at multiple points, especially in the early stages of his work. In reference to his categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, Peirce writes that the "list grew originally out of the study of the table of Kant."² This table, found in the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason is crucial in Peirce’s thinking, for it stands as Kant’s attempt to bring analytic unity to the manifold of representations in judgment and supplies the necessary triadic structure that characterizes Peirce’s system.

The community of Peirce scholars today seems to acknowledge the contribution Kant made to the development of American pragmatism³ and, more particularly, Peirce’s pragmaticism. This acknowledgement, however, has been somewhat cursory, and often serves as a mere preparatory move in highlighting the way in which Peirce overcomes and abandons the Kantian project as framed in the First Critique. According to Karl-Otto Apel, André De Tienne⁴ and Sandra Rosenthal,⁵ Peirce “grows up,” and “weans” himself from Kant’s formal theory of cognition. The commentators’ perspective on the relation between Peirce and Kant is understandable; despite his praise for the “king of modern philosophy,” Peirce regards Kant’s work as antiquated and underscores the way in which the Critique of Pure Reason stands apart from a more organic, active, and pragmatic reading of ontology and epistemology. Peirce writes that he “was a pure Kantist until he was forced by successive steps into pragmaticism.”⁶

My intent is not to reemphasize the arguments posed by Peirce against his philosophic forefather, but rather to suggest a type of response to these criticisms — a response made on Kant’s own terms. I will not attempt to

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extrapolate this response from the First Critique. Peirce’s extensive study of this work has made such an attempt nearly impossible. His analysis of Kant seems accurate if we, like Peirce, only take account of the Critique of Pure Reason. First, I will highlight the way in which Peirce justifiably criticizes parts of the Critique of Pure Reason and the various supporting roles certain commentators play in Kant’s critique. I will then examine the Critique of Judgment in showing how Kant himself abandons, or at least mediates, some of the dualisms and contradictions that Peirce finds so problematic in his earlier work. My analysis was motivated, at least in part, by Douglas Anderson’s observation that, in his fixation on logic, Peirce “paid little attention to Kant’s Third Critique” and might have overlooked Kant’s development of “imagination,” “genius,” and aesthetic creation on the grounds that they had little to do with the formal subjects of the first two Critiques.7 There is scant evidence that Peirce carefully considered Kant’s later works.8 I will argue that this omission in Peirce’s reading encourages him to maintain a strict demarcation between Kantianism and pragmaticism, one that seems unnecessary and unproductive in light of Kant’s rendering of aesthetics. In the examination of various themes of the Third Critique, I hope to expose Peirce’s Kantian inheritance to be far more extensive than Peirce or his commentators would like to admit. The lacunae I hope to identify in Peirce’s reading of the history of philosophy seem to be especially important in terms of Peirce’s own emphasis on historical continuity. If we are to take Peirce’s comments about continuity seriously, it seems to follow that we must acknowledge that his philosophical moves are, in a certain way, indebted to the preparatory maneuverings of earlier thinkers. At the very least, it seems appropriate to reveal any philosophic debts that might remain hidden.

The pitfalls this project faces are numerous and rather deep. The project rests on the belief that the Third Critique is a vital culminating moment in Kant’s corpus, a moment in which theory and praxis co-emerge. This belief, while controversial and slow in gaining acceptance, has been supported by Kant scholars such as John Sallis,9 Rudolf Makkreel, and John Zammito.10 They suggest that the thematic treatment of “imagination” and creative “play” (in both Kant’s method and justification) is not an afterthought, but rather the natural terminus of Kant’s journey into epistemology. If this is the case, then Peirce’s attention has been misdirected; since the concepts of continuity, hypothetical inquiry, mediation, and active agency are not to be found in the First Critique, but lie hidden in the Third. Before moving to an analysis of the Critique of Judgment, however, it is necessary to briefly address the specific ways in which Peirce believes he has departed from Kant’s system and the manner in which Peirce scholarship reinforces his claims.

II. Peirce’s First Critique: Schism and Schematism

In the First Critique, Kant poses the “problem of pure reason”: “How are
synthetic a priori judgments possible?" The question reflects a desire — one that Peirce inherits — to establish the groundwork for a pure mathematics and a pure science. Kant examines the possibility of the emergence of apodictic certainty from the ground of sensibility, yet on his own terms such an examination is bound to encounter almost immediate frustration. "All our knowledge begins with experience," but, by Kant’s account, the concepts of pure reason are pure only to the extent that they remain distinct from sensory experience.

The epistemic loggerhead that Kant confronts encourages him to develop the distinction between phenomena and noumena. This distinction, in turn, encourages Kant to develop the concept of the noumenal "thing-in-itself" as the unknowable ground of human cognition. Peirce, as a Critical Common-sensist, writes that, "The Kantist has only to abjure from the bottom of his heart the proposition that a thing-in-itself can, however indirectly, be conceived; and then correct the details of Kant’s doctrine accordingly, and he will find himself to have become a Critical Common-sensist." As Eckart Forester and others have noted, the gap which opens up between the noumenal and phenomenal and between knowledge and the thing in-itself is never effectively bridged in the First Critique. On this note, Peirce comments, "that Kant draws too hard a line between observation and ratiocination." In the end, Kant "is a sort of idealist himself" and is bound to maintain these disjunctions as logical contradictions. Pure concepts are unequivocally not empirical. Empirical observations are not pure. Such contradictions quickly melt away in light of Peirce’s emphasis on triadic mediation in which observation and thought are not held apart but co-emerge in a kind of abductive play. Peircean mediation and abduction will be addressed shortly.

The bifurcated terms Kant employs to describe human cognition reflect both his acceptance of and quiet dissatisfaction with the dyadic logic to which he adheres. Kant divides concepts into the categories of "empirical" and "pure" in an effort to preserve a kernel of apodicticity in his epistemology. This apodictic certainty, however, cannot be accessed in the world of experience, and indeed, is forever threatened by the confusion of empirical observation. In holding apart these two cognitive realms, Kant believes he has secured a type of epistemological bedrock, yet in his act of separating, this bedrock recedes from the empirical world it was supposed to ground. Once again, the contradiction of synthetic a priori judgments rears its ugly head. According to a certain reading of the First Critique, Kant is unable to accept Peirce’s alternate logic and corresponding epistemology that might free him from this contradiction. Peirce suggests that this contradiction reflects Kant’s commitment to traditional first order logic in its adherence to the law of non-contradiction and excluded middle. Kant fails to develop Peircean triadic logic that would free him from these difficulties, but would also force him to revise his definition of scientific certainty. It is on this note that Peirce states that
Kant was “completely ignorant of the logic of relatives”\textsuperscript{16} and “consistently neglected the logic of relations.”\textsuperscript{17}

This also amounts to saying that Kant did not understand Peircean continuity, or understand the way in which the notion of continuity might be able to bridge the schisms found in the \textit{Critique of Pure Reason}. Peirce observes that, “Kant confounds (continuity) with infinite divisibility, saying that the essential character of a continuous series is that between any two members of it a third can always be found.”\textsuperscript{18} Highlighting the necessity of divisibility does not ease tension one finds in the \textit{First Critique} and may only explain Kant’s incessant splicing of the cognitive faculties. The Peircean palliative for the \textit{First Critique} lies not in the inevitability of an emergent third term (Kant after all recognized the necessity of this emergence), but in refining the scope and determination of this term. It lies in allowing this third term to reside in a realm beyond the strict confines of traditional first-order logic.

Peirce does not fully develop the odd disposition of the “third” until his 1898 Cambridge Lectures. In an earlier account of continuity, Peirce grapples with the concept by identifying the inadequacy of Kantian and Aristotelian notions of the continuum. Peirce notes that infinite divisibility leaves “gaps” in the continuum and simply calls for ever finer divisibility. This is, once again, the standard reading of Kant’s treatment, and confuses the character of a series of rational fractions with a true continuum. Aristotle’s rendering of continuous fields comes even closer to the model that Peirce later proposes, but lacks an essential point that Peirce will eventually recognize. He explains the “Aristotelical principle,” a principle of continuity based on limit functions, in relatively simple terms:

Suppose a surface to be part red and part blue; so that every point on it is either red or blue, and of course, no part can be both red and blue. What then is the boundary line between red and blue?...Now as parts of the surface in the immediate neighborhood of any ordinary point upon a curved boundary are half red and half blue, it follows that the boundary is both half red and half blue.\textsuperscript{19}

It is important to note, however, that this description assumes the law of non-contradiction as a necessary presupposition. Aristotle’s limit function between “red and blue” again begs the question, What occupies the position between these respective halves? At this point, Peirce does not seem to have a suitable answer to this question. It would seem that this attempt at describing continuity omits the logical turn Peirce will more fully develop and the mediation that it affords.

In his 1898 Cambridge Lectures, Peirce revises his comments in regard to
true continuity and the disposition of the mediating third term that it necessitates. The third term between “red and blue,” between distinct series in the continuum, are not “half red and half blue” in the sense of creating yet another division, but rather embody a type of mediating position that is, at once, both red and blue. Here, Peirce suggests the acting role of his “third” in modeling continuity. The “third,” and hence continuity, defies dyadic logic, for it acts between and spans the gap that appears to separate binary terms. In a rare moment of non-technical analysis, Peirce describes thirdness: “[It] is the boundary between the black and the white, is neither black, nor white, nor neither, nor both. It is the pairedness of the two. It is for the white, the active secondness of the black, for the black, the active secondness of the white.”

Peirce notes that this boundary serves as an effective mediator by virtue of its contradictory character, in its “ability” to break the law of non-contradiction. At first, it may appear that this paradox arises from the generation of the binary, firstness-secondness. Peirce, however, insists that thirdness is always already present in the continuum — the undifferentiated possibility that receives and grants the possibility of any determination. The third is not just some random thing placed between two others, but, as the continuum, serves as the root from which determination can be made. It is in this respect that he occasionally remarks that “original potentiality is essentially continuous.” By his account, the appearance of any particular third is simply another moment of continuity’s continual disclosure. It is with this in mind that we have to read Peirce’s comment:

First and Second, Agent and Patient, Yes and No, are categories which enable us roughly to describe the facts of experience and they satisfy the mind for a long time. But at last they are found inadequate and the third is the conception which is then called for. The Third is that which bridges over the chasm between the absolute first and last, and brings them into relationship.

This bridging is forever present and continually translates between ostensibly separate realms. It is worth noting that this third is a bridge only to the extent that it is bridging, that is to say, only to the extent that it is acting as a bridge.

This cursory note on continuity has been made in the effort to frame deficiencies in Kant’s handling of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. For this reason, let us ignore the way in which Peirce’s discussion of firstness and secondness inherits the terms “agent” and “patient” from Kant’s category of relation. Let us also overlook the possibility that Kant addresses the “reciprocal action between the active and the passive, between agent and patient,” in the development of his notion of “community” in the First
Critique. This contention will be developed in full later when I address the reciprocal action of genius and the development of the sensus communis that are so central to the Third Critique. For now, let us temporarily turn our attention to another section of the First Critique, to a place Peirce again makes explicit his departure from Kant. Peirce cites the chapter on the Schematism as Kant’s most notable and tragic attempt to recognize the role of active mediation.

At the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant asks two questions: “How can perception be subsumed under a pure conception? How can a category be applied in determination of an object of sense?”22 In a certain sense, Kant is repeating himself, reopening the question that initiates the work as a whole, the question concerning synthetic a priori judgments. At this point, however, Kant provides at least a temporary answer:

Manifestly, there must be a third thing, which is homogeneous on the one hand with the category, and on the other hand with the object of sense, and which thus makes the application of one to the other possible. This mediating idea must be pure, or free from any empirical element, yet it must be at once intellectual and sensuous. Such an idea is the transcendental schema.23

Here Kant offers us a moment of continuity that appears almost Peircean. It reflects an odd departure from the dualistic logic that grounds most of the Kantian corpus. At many points in this section, Kant comments that the schemata are products of the imagination, of the third and final faculty of cognition. The schema, however, is no mere product in the sense of being a thing, rather it is a continuous “unity in the general determination of sensibility.” Imagination produces the schemata only to the extent that the schema acts in its function of mediating between pure and empirical concepts and objects of the world. This follows from Kant’s earlier suggestion that, “[s]ynthesis in general, as we shall hereafter see is the mere result of the imagination, a blind but indispensable art of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious.”24 In conclusion, Kant writes that, “without schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the understanding for producing concepts, but they present no object.”25

The bivalent character of the schemata and the imagination forces one to remember Kant’s framing of the other two stems of knowledge, understanding and sense. In opening the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant ambiguously writes, “Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown root.”26 In returning to the
“blind” faculty of the imagination of which we are “scarcely ever conscious,” is Kant returning to the common root of understanding and sensibility? In response to this question, Peirce is dismissive, and perhaps, justifiably so. Having identified what might prove to be the lynchpin of his epistemological system, Kant seemingly abandons the topics of imagination and schemata. He glimpses the possibility for real mediation, but quickly withdraws — back into his dualistic framework. In the last sections of the Critique, Kant seems to rededicate himself to the dualistic logic that characterized the modern era on the whole.

Peirce criticizes Kant for this oversight, but not before appropriating Kant’s insight on imagination, writing, “[i]t remains true that there is, after all, nothing but imagination that can ever supply [one] an inkling of the truth. He can stare stupidly at phenomena; but in the absence of imagination they will not connect themselves together in any rational way.”27 In reference to Kant’s cursory treatment of the schemata, Peirce asserts that Kant’s “doctrine of the schemata can only have been an afterthought, an addition to his system after it was substantially complete. For if the schemata had been considered early enough, they would have overgrown his whole work.”28 Peirce’s statement is undoubtedly correct, that is, however, only if we outline Kant’s system strictly in terms of the First Critique. I will attempt to make the case that the spirit of the schemata does overgrow Kant’s system in the Third Critique and grant him the opportunity to fill out concepts such as “imagination”, “artistic play”, “genius”, and “aesthetic taste”, ones that resemble, if not give birth to, Peircean tenets.

Peirce’s review of the First Critique would not be complete without revisiting the epistemological-ontological separation that most agree Kant maintains even in light of his brief gestures toward the schematism and imagination. Again, this comment is made simply to examine the divide that Peirce establishes between his own work and that of Kant. Only in such a way can the Third Critique be evaluated in its ability to bridge this gap.

Forester and Apel echo Peirce in noting the way in which Kant follows Hume’s lead in restricting epistemological a priori unity to the realm of the human mind. Indeed, even the mediating power of the imagination seems to be relegated to the constraints of the human psyche. Apel writes that Kant “makes his synthetic a priori rules which he puts in the place of Hume’s psychological laws of association, rules of the function of psychic faculties.”29 Apel can find ample support for this reading in the First Critique. In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant writes:

Combination is a spontaneous act of consciousness, and, as such, it is the especial characteristic of understanding, as distinguished from sense...this act we call by the general name synthesis, to raw attention
to the fact that we can be conscious of nothing as combined in the object which we ourselves have not previously combined. And, as it proceeds entirely from the self-activity of the subject, combination is the element, the only element, that cannot be given by the object.30

The synthetic unity of apperception that Kant takes up after his discussion of the imagination and schemata stands apart from the world, and, for Kant, orders the scattered and chaotic empirical world that Hume so succinctly outlines.31 According to Peirce, in adopting this philosophic stance one is forced to assume a type of nominalism that is incapable of founding a real science or mathematics.32 He states that, “Kant gives us the erroneous view that ideas are presented separated then brought together in the mind.”33 Peirce expands on this argument and underscores its implications when he writes that, “The nominalist, by isolating his reality so entirely from mental influence as he has done, has made it something which the mind cannot conceive; he has created the so often talked of ‘improportion between the mind and the thing in itself.’”34 Decker echoes Peirce’s statement and suggests that Peirce’s project amounts to “de-psychologizing Kant,” reinterpreting transcendental logic without “psychic basis” and without relegating the transcendent to an unknowable noumenal realm.35

In light of his distaste for Kant’s description of the noumenon and the nominalism that it necessitates in the First Critique, it may seem somewhat surprising that Peirce arrives at the conclusion that “Being is what can be thought.”36 At first glance, this comment seems to reflect an extreme form of the constructivism he seeks to reject. A closer examination of this statement, however, in conjunction with Peirce’s works such as the “Law of Mind” and “Evolutionary Love” may deliver one to a radically different conclusion. Peirce does not want to recapitulate the mistakes he identifies in the First Critique by either binding reality to the constraints of the mental, or detaching the mental from the ground of reality. Instead of retracing what he considers to be modern tendencies and mistakes, Peirce harkens back to the Parminedean fragment, “Thinking and Being are the same.”37 For Peirce, there is no divide between epistemological ordering and the ordering of the natural world; both assume the same triadic structuring. It is in this sense that Peirce writes: “What is reality?...so far as there is reality, what that reality consists in is this: That there is in the being of things something which corresponds to the process of reasoning, that the world lives, and moves and HAS ITS BEING, in a logic of events. We all think of nature as syllogizing.”38 More simply but perhaps too hastily put, Peirce holds that there is no dividing line between epistemology and ontology. It is in this respect that the title of Peirce’s Cambridge 1898 lectures on logic, Reasoning and the Logic of Things, is seen in its full import.
Continuity and the possibility of order are found in, and created by, the world — in and by the relation of things — of which the human mind is but another instantiation. At first glance, this seems to be a complete departure from the Kantian notion of the thing-in-itself. For Peirce, things themselves reflect an order and type of agency that is wholly commensurate with the ordering of the human mind and, indeed, stand as the sine qua non of formal logic and human cognition.

In the forthcoming analysis of the Third Critique, it will be necessary to identify points in Kant’s discussion of aesthetics where he develops the notion of continuity and seems to recognize the triadic structuring that the continuum presupposes. An examination of reflexive judgment and aesthetic inquiry will serve this purpose. To fully bridge the gap between Kant and Peirce, however, this analysis must also show, at least to some extent, that the structure of thirdness is not unique, or restricted to, the human mind. It must be shown that there is continuity between the natural and the human. Our investigation of continuity must not stop at the epistemological, but reach into the arena of the ontological. This task is undoubtedly the most difficult, but also the most vital. It will be taken up through the coming sections but most notably in the remarks made on the correspondence between artistic creation and natural creation as framed by Kant in the Third Critique.

III. The Third Critique: Imagination, Mediation, and Common Sense

In the highly technical introductions to the Third Critique, Kant presents the Critique of Judgment “as mediating the connection between the two parts of philosophy (theoretical and practical) to form a whole.”39 Right away, one is struck by Kant’s anticipation of the pragmatic, and particularly Peircean, project. This comment about mediation has granted commentators a kind of license to interpret the logical and epistemical claims of the First Critique in terms of the Third. On these grounds, Schaper notes that the Schematism — part of the First Critique’s “Doctrine of Judgment” — has posed problems for interpreters, and many have wondered whether Kant’s thought had fully matured at the time he wrote it. Schaper responds to these interpreters that, “The third Critique was still to come. Might it not shed some light on the chapter in which Kant speaks of the schematism as an ‘art concealed in the depth of the human soul’ (B 182)?” Likewise, might it not shed light on the tension, perhaps unfounded, between Kant and Peirce? Even in his later writings Kant is struggling with the possibility of synthetic judgments. Might we not take Schaper’s suggestion seriously that “aesthetic judgments as they are discussed in the first part of the Critique of Judgment can be seen as paradigmatically exhibiting the ground for the possibility of judgment tout court.”40

While imagination and the schematism are quickly subdued by the understanding in the First Critique, constrained to separate “reproductive”
and “productive” roles, in the Critique of Judgment, imagination frees itself from its determinant function and plays a creative and reflective role in aesthetic judgments. In the First Critique, Kant writes that if the universal (the rule), or principle, or law is given, then the judgment is determinant. On the other hand, reflective judgment (Kant further defines this term in reference to two more, aesthetic and teleological) stands as “the capacity for reflecting on a given representation according to a certain principle, to produce a possible concept.” Once again, Kant’s intent is to reconcile the specific and the general, the particular and the universal, but here Kant takes a more subtle approach in developing reflective judgement. Kant clarifies the initial distinction between reflective and determining judgement in the Second (and final) Introduction of the Critique of Judgement; he restates this sentiment in the Logic (1800). Kant writes:

Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) be given, the judgement which subsumes the particular under it (even if, as transcendental judgement, it furnishes, a priori, the conditions in conformity with which that subsumption under the universal is possible) is determinant. But if only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the judgement is merely reflective.41

Kant’s comment that such judgement is “merely reflective” does not, despite our common understanding of “mere,” diminish the importance of this cognitive faculty. His use of bloss, often translated as “mere,” can also mean “only,” “simply,” “openly,” “manifestly,” and “solely” In this light, it might be more accurate to say that “if only the particular be given for which the universal has to be found, the judgement” is solely — or can only be — reflective. Reflective judgement possesses characteristics that are uniquely its own and holds a particular and important place in Kant’s work.

To better understand the distinction between reflective judgement and determining judgement and to emphasize the unspoken lineage between Kant and Peirce, it seems necessary to make two comments on the character of reflective judgement. The first regards the faculty’s spontaneity, the second its hypothetical nature.

In the instance of reflective judgment, imagination is described as “self-activating” (selbstaetig)42 and spontaneous. Its function in aesthetic judgments is characterized as a type of “lively play.”43 Crawford provides an insightful description of this “play” and highlights the epistemological revision it involves:
The imagination is in “free play” in the manner in which it gathers together the manifold of intuition (CJ, 9)...in the reflective aesthetic judgment, my concern in the gathering operation is not to find a unity which fits some concept or other that my understanding can provide; rather my concern is only whether the organization or arrangement is such that some concept or other ought to be applicable. In other words, a successful aesthetic reflective judgment is achieved when the experience culminates: “Aha! It — the gathered manifold — exhibits a rule-governed-ness just as if it could be subsumed under a concept. It satisfies the conditions for cognition in general.”

Crawford’s description of aesthetic judgment is worth unpacking, for it underlines the difference between these reflective judgments and those described as “determinant” in the Critique of Pure Reason. In his earlier work, Kant seems to suggest that the type of investigation implicit in determinate judgments culminates when a unity is formed from the manifold of appearance and subsumed under a pure and pre-established rule. In the case of reflective judgment, however, no such rule is given a priori. The situation of the play itself supplies the rule and direction for the activity of imagination. The situation suggests what conceptual framework might be possible in application. Peirce repeatedly emphasizes the “Aha!” sensation, the spontaneous coalescence of particular observations and possible order, as the basis for, and outcome of, scientific investigation.

For Kant, the inquiry of aesthetic play remains provisional, fallible, in a very real sense, hypothetical. The manifold exhibits a structure and dynamic as if it could be subsumed under a concept. The inquiry reaches culmination in an aesthetic feeling, a harmonizing between imagination and understanding. Makkreel and others are hesitant to describe this harmonizing as just another Kantian “synthesis.” As Makkreel notes, “a harmony involves a reciprocal relation between two distinct elements; a synthesis as Kant conceives it, involves a one-sided influence for the sake of strict unity.” It is interesting to note the family resemblance reflected between Peircean thirdness and aesthetic harmony. Peirce’s notion of “thirdness” is a mediating acting that brings distinct entities into relation without destroying their respective particularities. In the Third Critique, Kant makes scant use of the term “synthesis” in the discussion of imagination’s function in artistic apprehension, instead employing primarily the language of play, harmony, common sense, and feeling. As Makkreel notes, this shift has been overlooked by most commentators despite it being a radical departure from the terminology of the First Critique, in which all of the functions of the imagination “whether
concerning the apprehension of space, the reproduction of images, or the production of schemata — are described in terms of acts of synthesis."46

To this point, I have discussed the difference between what might be called epistemic and aesthetic knowing and suggested that the obstacles Kant faces in the former might be overcome in his treatment of the latter. A last word needs to be said in regard to the position and role of “certainty” in each instance. More specifically, a distinction needs to be made between “certainty” as rendered in Kant’s earlier works and the rendition he provides in his analysis of aesthetics. Kant emphasizes the role of imaginative mediation in artistic inquiry and the role of feeling (pleasure) in identifying the efficacy of this mediation. In allowing subjective feeling to ground the harmonizing play of the imagination, Kant knows he is treading on rather treacherous philosophic ground. One ought to remember as Guyer does that, in the Second Critique, “Kant defines pleasure ‘as the idea of the agreement of an object or action with the subjective conditions of life.’”47 One might also recall the difficulty he faces in both of the earlier Critiques when he flirts with the subjective character of knowledge and morality and the inability of this character to be communicated or universalized. Again, in the Critique of Judgment, by recognizing the role of aesthetic feeling, he risks jettisoning any sort of criterion for the apprehension of the beautiful. At the very least, he is forced to draw reflective judgment away from the pure justification and certainty that seems so important in the Critique of Pure Reason.

In the Critique of Judgment, Kant exchanges apodictic justification for aesthetic common sense; the sensus communis now stands as the ever-evolving benchmark for artistic production and apprehension. Instead of retreating from the treacherous philosophic ground as he does in the First and Second Critiques, in the Third, Kant negotiates this region, providing an alternative to the static and atemporal vision of aesthetic certainty: the harmonious sense of the artistic community. This community shares and shapes history. Kant comes to realize that his hope for a priori certainty is, very literally, a thing of the past. Like history itself, the artistic community provides a certain rendering of what is, and subtly directs our attention to what ought to be. Drucilla Cornell’s description of the sensus communis seems particularly appropriate when she writes, “The future nature of this community of the ought to be remains open as a possibility in the sensus communis aestheticus. It implies a “publicness” that awaits us, not one that is actually given us, or one that can be given to us once and for all in any predetermined public form.”48

The sensus communis is ever-evolving — meaning that it is simultaneously permanent and conditional. It provides both the enabling conditions and limiting factors for aesthetic apprehension and creation. It is in this sense that Kant insists that we “compare our judgment with the possible judgments of others...and thus put ourselves in the position of everyone else.” This process of comparison is not governed by a determinant rule, but is realized
intersubjectively by the community of aesthetic taste and is hypothetical and affective in nature. It is hypothetical insofar as the result and end of aesthetic judgment (used in both artistic creation and apprehension) cannot by given as a pre-established rule. Kant elaborates on this point, writing: “We could even define taste as the ability to judge something that makes our feeling in a given perception universally communicable without mediation by any (determinate) concept.”49 Here, Kant also insists that the play of the imagination can be both subjectively felt and universally communicable. That is to say, it can embody realms that Kant earlier — in the Critique of Pure Reason — designates as incommensurable. Kant recognizes that the sensus communis is in no way a static entity or noumenal category. It is a continuous bridging of the artistic generations that reflects both a kind of determinacy and a kind of spontaneity.

This “bridging” is perhaps most pronounced in Kant’s rendering of the artistic genius. Genius stands as a moment of continuity in relation to both the order of aesthetic “common sense” and the order of natural beauty. Let us begin by examining this relation in terms of the natural world. It was already mentioned that the play of the imagination as framed in the Critique of Judgment was productive and creative rather than merely reproductive. This production is intended and realized by genius:

Genius is the talent (natural gift) which gives the rule to art. Since talent, as the innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may express the matter thus: Genius is the innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.50

Note the turn of words that Kant uses in this passage. Genius is given by nature as a natural gift, yet it is precisely through this gift that the genius acquires the ability to give the “rule to art.” Genius, in this sense is wholly passive, and yet, at once, wholly active. Sobel expands on this point, noting that, “although ‘genius’ is productive, Kant’s description of this faculty is also receptive. It is that through which nature gives the rule to art. Nature acts ‘by the medium of genius.’”51 The contrast between this description of genius and the typical reading of the transcendental unity of apperception in the First Critique is truly remarkable. Genius is not in, above, or below nature. Genius is not apart from nature. Genius is of nature. It stands as the acting mediator between the ordered beauty of the world and the ordered beauty of the aesthetic. Indeed, this faculty demonstrates the continuity of (between) human artistry and the natural world. Insofar as genius is of the world, its aesthetic judgments and products must be of a unique character and stand against the anthropomorphic framing of knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason. This gifted individual is “an author of a product for which he is indebted (verdankt)
to his genius...he does not know himself how he came by his ideas...Genius itself cannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings about its products, and it is rather as nature that it gives the rule.”52 There is always an element of surprise in the inquiry of genius, for an element of the inquiry is always beyond his control. Genius is simultaneously discovering and creating the harmony of the beautiful; again, this remark gels with the comment that genius is “unsought” and “undesigned.”53

Kant repeatedly emphasizes genius’ originality, suggestion that “on this point everyone agrees: that genius must be considered the very opposite of the spirit of imitation.” In Section 49, Kant states that the imagination’s free harmony cannot be brought about by referencing the rules of “science or mechanical imitation,” but can only be realized by the “subject’s nature.”54 Despite Kant’s emphasis on the originality of genius, the products of genius, in as much as they are beautiful, are not wholly free from constraint. In faithfully translating the orderability of the natural world, genius is forever bound to nature’s structure and emergence. In the thick of things, nature gives genius its cues. Genius responds by reading these cues more or less faithfully. Admittedly, no reading is exact, and no two translations are exactly alike. This being said, however, all readings, to the extent that they are translations, are limited in a certain respect. Just because the free play of the imagination cannot have a determinate concept as its ruling basis, does not mean that the beautiful is free from rules altogether.

This freedom within limits, a productive tension later situated in Peirce’s notion of pragmatic creativity, appears again when Kant begins to talk about the genius in relation to the common sense of aesthetic taste. He writes that taste, embodied in the sensus communis “severely clips (genius’) wings and makes it civilized, polished ... It introduces clarity and order in the wealth of thought and hence makes the ideas durable, fit for being followed by others and fit for an ever advancing culture.” The flight of genius is grounded, at least in part, by the past forms of the sensus communis, yet this playful faculty still has the force to stretch and challenge these constraints. Indeed, it is the power of genius that expands the notion of aesthetic taste and propels Kant’s “ever advancing culture.” The act of genius is executed on the paradoxical cusp between past actualities and future possibilities, in that odd “middle ground” where universality and particularity, determinacy and freedom, hold equal sway. Interestingly, Kant describes this cusp as a type of “happy relation” that the genius enjoys between itself and nature and between itself and the sensus communis. Kant writes to this effect:

Hence the genius actually consists in the happy relation — one that no science can teach and that cannot be learned by any diligence — allowing us, first, to discover ideas for a given concept, and, second,
to hit upon a way of expressing these ideas that enables us to communicate to others, as accompanying the concept, the mental attunement that those ideas produce.55

Kant is careful not to speak of a determinate point towards which this aesthetic discovery and expression advances, nor a particular terminus in the evolution of culture. Such a pre-established teleology would compromise the freedom which he attributes to artistic genius. This passage is unique not only in its expression of a rendering of creativity that might support certain pragmatic sentiments, but also in the way in which Kant slips between the use of "genius" and the use of "us." It seems quite plausible that genius is keystone for fine art, but also, and perhaps more importantly, the very lynchpin of discourse and conceptual meaning.

At this point, a cautionary note needs to be voiced. In the current analysis, I am not suggesting that Kant's Third Critique is classically pragmatic, nor am I implying that Kant wholly discards his earlier notion of determinacy and his hope for apodictic certainty. I merely hope to point to a place at which common ground can be exposed between the later Kant and the American tradition, especially between Kant and Peirce. Implicitly, I am suggesting that Peirce's criticism of Kant may at points amount to a kind of attack on a philosophic straw man. The Critique of Pure Reason was not the only, nor the culminating, work of Kant. Peirce's notion of abduction (in both its method and "justificatory" strength) and musement seem to resemble Kant's development of reflective judgment in the Third Critique.

IV. Peirce on Musement, Abduction, and Community

On December 23, 1908, Peirce wrote to Lady Welby, referring at multiple points to works and writers that had inspired his interest in abductive reasoning and the dispositions of "musement" and "play" that accompany it. He writes that, "as for the word 'play,' the first book I ever read ... was Schiller's Aesthetic Briefe where he has so much to say about the Spiel-Trieb; and it made such an impression upon me as to have soaked my notion of 'play' to this day."56 Peirce's admiration for Friedrich Schiller is deep and heartfelt. In his "General and Historical Survey of Logic," Pierce recounts the many days spent during his youth reading this text, but also acknowledges the shortcomings of his childish reading. Pierce abashedly admits: "I read various works on esthetics; but on the whole, I must confess that, like most logicians, I have pondered that subject far too little. The books do seem so feeble. That affords one excuse." The feebleness of the books, however, is not the principle reason for Peirce's move to more technical work. He explains, "esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to different universes." Peirce, in his logic of relatives, begins to mediate between these opposing disciplines.
It is only very recently that I have become persuaded that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the help of esthetics. The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a short one filled with doubts and queries mainly.57

It is not necessarily surprising that Peirce draws so heavily on Schiller in his development of normative science, abductive play, and triadic logic. Schiller very obviously believes that through artistic and interactive Spiel, one comes to recognize the order of things as the order of the mind. What is surprising is that, in his young reading of Schiller, Peirce does not recognize the wellspring from which this proto-pragmatist has received philosophic nourishment. Schiller’s notion of play (Spiel) is taken in large part from the work of Kant. Schiller bypasses the Critique of Reason and assumes the Kantian aesthetic project as given in the Critique of Judgment. While he undoubtedly does a better job in describing artistic play and production, Schiller maintains the basic structure of reflective judgment — its hypothetical and spontaneous growth, and its mode of justification. He hands these conceptions down to Peirce.

Peirce, in turn, unknowingly, extends the movement of Kantian aesthetics (via Schiller) in a pragmatic and relational inquiry. Ironically, this revision is meant to expose the inadequacies of the Critique of Pure Reason, a work that Peirce thinks accurately summarizes Kant’s corpus on the whole. At this point such a summary ought to seem inadequate at best. By overlooking the Critique of Judgment, by overlooking the very work that Peirce disregards, commentators such as Apel are able to assert without qualification that, "Peirce replaces Kant’s alternative of synthetic a priori and synthetic a posteriori propositions with the fruitful circle of the correlative propositions of hypothetical abductive inference and experimental confirmation."58 A qualification is in order. The previous discussion has attempted to show how Kant himself replaces the dichotomies of the First Critique with the “fruitful circle” of aesthetic play and reflective judgment, and, through this replacement, provides a certain legacy to the unwittingly critical Peirce. In a brief explication of Peircean musement, abduction and community, I will now attempt to highlight the similarities between the work of Peirce and that of the later Kant.

Peirce's unknowing acquisition of Kant’s Third Critique can be underscored in an analysis of “musement” as Peirce describes it in his “Neglected Argument.” Musement is a moment of Kantian reflexivity, imaginative play. Peirce fleshes out musement thusly:

It is pure play (having) no rules except this very law of
liberty. It bloweth were it listeth. It has no purpose, unless recreation... It begins passively enough with drinking in the impression of some nook in one of the three Universes. But impression soon passes into attentive observation, observation into musing, musing into a lively give and take of communion between self and self. If one's observations and reflections are allowed to specialize themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific study; and that cannot be pursued in odd half hours.59

Play's purpose is re-creation; its purpose is to literally create again. The muser is attentive and, like the artistic genius, is receptive to the natural ordering. Musement "bloweth where it listeth." The voices of these verbs are intentionally ambiguous — hovering oddly between activity and passivity. One can blow, but also be blown. To "list" is to desire, but also to be compelled. Here, Peirce seems to know exactly what connotation his words convey. Grammatically, he is attempting to express the "to and fro," "give and take," of imaginative Spiel. Musement, like Kantian aesthetic judgment, is not prescribed by any a priori rule or constraint, but rather discovers and develops the constraints of an evolving situation. Musement cannot be described in terms of traditional logical analysis. While musement is unable to be described logically, it nonetheless gives rise to inquiry, or rather a specific type of inquiry. Peirce notes that musement hints at an hypothesis (as it does in "The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God") and also points to the abductive logic that develops this hypothesis.

Peirce repeatedly comments that abductive reasoning has the structure of hypothesis formation and acts between the natures of deduction and induction. Abduction does not proceed from fixed principles, nor does it operate strictly from the apprehension of chance phenomena. At one point, Peirce calls abduction "probable inference."60 More specifically, he writes:

An Abduction is a method of forming a general prediction without any positive assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justification being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct rationally, and that Induction from past experience gives us strong encouragement to hope that it will be successful in the future.61

The certainty of abduction, like the certainty of reflexive judgments, remains strictly provisional since it cannot rely on determinate rules or concepts. Just
because hypothesis "gives us strong encouragement to hope that it will be successful in the future" does not mean that one can rely on this hope unconditionally. Again, employing Schiller, Pierce writes that, "Mr. Schiller himself seems sometimes to say, there is not the smallest scintilla of logical justification for any assertion that a given sort of result will, as a matter of fact, either always or never come to pass."62 Peirce, by way of Schiller, is recapitulating Kant's understanding that the play of the imagination can neither be predicted nor determined for all time. Neither induction nor deduction allows for the type of spontaneity that Peirce both witnesses in the world and creates in his logic of relations. "No new truth can come from induction or from deduction."63 Abduction, like creative play, fits the bill in providing an "original suggestion."64

Just as Kant's genius cannot give an articulate explanation of aesthetic apprehension, Peirce's inquirer cannot "give a reason for (abduction)...and it needs no reason, since it merely offers suggestions."65 In a certain sense, Peircean inquiry is beyond the knowledge and power of the inquirer. To use Kantian language that remains faithful to Peirce, the inquirer is the "natural gift" through which nature gives the rule to investigation. Again, this rule is not a concept, but an informed suggestion, a type of "prompting." The inquirer is, at once, productive and receptive. Abduction depends on one's ability to listen and respond to the natural ordering of the world. Peirce elaborates on the necessary continuity between investigation and the natural world, writing in "The Architecture of Theories":

Thus it is that, our minds having been formed under the influence of phenomena governed by the laws of mechanics, certain conceptions entering into those laws become implanted in our minds, so that we readily guess at what the laws are. Without such a natural prompting, having to search blindfold for a law which would suit the phenomena, our chance of finding it would be as one to infinity.66

It is true that abductive reasoning simply amounts to suggesting or "guessing," but here Peirce notes that this guessing is not simply random. Abduction relies on the fact that nature lends itself to the order-ability of the mind and, indeed, that this order is of nature. This statement seems to mesh nicely with the comments made earlier in reference to the ingenium of Kantian genius, a freedom with restraint. In one instance, Peirce even acknowledges this connection between abduction and imaginative genius but fails to recognize Kant as a possible source of philosophic inspiration. He suggests that the realities of nature compel us to put some things into very close relation and others less so, "but it is the genius of the mind, that takes up all
these hints of sense, adds immensely to them, makes them precise, and shows
them in intelligible form in the intuitions of space and time.”67 This is precisely
the role that imagination assumes in reflective judgments as presented in the
Third Critique and briefly addressed in our earlier discussion. Peirce in the
“Methods for Attaining Truth,” like Kant in the Critique of Judgment,
repeatedly insists that the genius of abductive inquiry must simultaneously be
receptive to the “natural light” of the world’s order and be continuous with this lume naturale. He notes that if the general observations of the universe all
but demonstrate its conformity to a type of lawfulness, and if the human mind
has been shaped under the force of these laws, “it is to be expected that
(human beings) should have a natural light, or light of nature, or instinctive
insight, or genius, tending to make (them) guess those laws aright, or nearly
aright.”68 Peirce insists that there is a type of free attunement, a kind of genius,
that allows one to study the ordering of nature.

In surveying Peirce’s expansive corpus, one is initially struck by his
hesitancy to speak of truth simpliciter. Of course his hesitancy is
understandable when one recognizes Peirce’s reliance on abductive reasoning,
on the creative guesswork that sediments his notion of pragmatic truth. In a
typically broad generalization, Peirce goes so far as to say that, “if you carefully
consider the question of pragmatism you will see that it is nothing else than
the question of the logic of abduction.” The puzzlement, however, remains:
How might the question of pragmatism, of abduction, be answered with any
type of certainty? In light of the current comparison between Kantian
aesthetics and the work of Peirce, one might ask several related questions. If
abductive reasoning, in the Peircean sense, resembles Kant’s conception of
aesthetic judgment, might one also expect similarities to emerge in the
justificatory frameworks of each method of inquiry? More simply put, might
aesthetic judgement and abductive “validity” be of the same order? More
specifically, might one expect to find a version of the Kantian sensus communis
and aesthetic sensibility lurking beneath the surface of Peirce’s formal system?

It seems fairly straightforward to say that a particular abduction cannot be
proven as formally or universally valid according to the standards of binary
logic. For Peirce, at least in the cases of induction and abduction, “validity” is
experienced in a type of felt harmony in a particular situation. Effective
abductions are affective. This type of validity is a feeling of appropriateness in
relation to a given premise. The goodness of a good guess is felt — for the
time being — in its active mediation of a circumstance. It is in this sense that
Peirce remarks that, “the [mediating] triad ... has ... for its principal element
merely a certain unanalyzable quality sui generis. It makes [to be sure] a certain
feeling in us.”69 This feeling, however, is not simply subjective, but rather
always maintains the possibility to be communicated and evaluated by a
community of inquirers. In “A Survey of Pragmaticism,” Peirce writes the
Schiller inspired him to unify subjective feeling and objective constraint and
encouraged him to maintain a “conditional idealism.”

This “conditional idealism” has already been partially described in Kant’s development of the aesthetic sensus communis that is paradoxically free and determinate. This communal sense is determinate in that it establishes the “rules” and guidelines for genius. It is free precisely to the extent that genius expands these “rules” and extends these established guidelines. The sensus communis, and hence, aesthetic justification, evolves and is evolving. Interestingly, the genealogical movement of thought presented in the “Law of Mind” and the continuous lineages highlighted in “Evolutionary Love” seem to progress in a similar fashion and adhere to similar modes of justification.

In the “Law of Mind,” Peirce identifies this one law in the following manner: “[I]deas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas.” Ideas spread, but do not spread randomly. Each thought is affected by the entire history of thought, by all previous thoughts, to a greater or lesser extent. Being bound to this history does not mean that a particular thought is not free, it simply means that thought is both free and constrained. The genealogy of the mind delimits the field of free possibility for future moments of thought. It seems appropriate for Pierce to first describe the free individuality of thought, as he does in the initial section of this essay, and then provide the conditions of this possibility by describing its continuity in the second section.

It is clear that Peirce’s notion of the mind’s continuity does apply simply to a particular mind, but also to the collective Mind of the community of inquiry. One ought to remember that Kant’s notion of reflective (aesthetic) judgment hinges on the subjective feeling of the judgment and this feeling’s continuity with the nature of the sensus communis. Josiah Royce makes this point more poignantly in his emphasis on community and inter-subjectivity, but Pierce also seems well aware of its implications. On this note, Peirce opens the “Law of Mind” by noting that the thought of Emerson stands in and as a type of intellectual lineage, and has been affected and constrained by Schelling, Plotinus, Boehm, and the Eastern mystics. The realization of continuity itself — continuity with the social nature of Mind — becomes the dynamic benchmark for Peircean “certainty.” Perhaps more light can be shed on this statement by suggesting that in the movement of common sense, an inquirer comes to feel a type of continuity in the lineage of Mind. In recognizing the continuity of Mind, one is, at once, acknowledging and disclosing the continuity of nature. Both Peirce and Kant struggle to make this point, and to make it clearly. More often than not, however, both writers seem to get bogged down by their formalism and use of metaphor.

In “Evolutionary Love,” Peirce’s use of language and imagery get in the way of an effective explication of organic and intellectual evolution. Once
again, Peirce presents various genealogies (organic, literary, intellectual, and historical) that exhibit the type of triadic mediation that continuity presupposes. By omitting the new terms ("agapism" and "tychism") that Peirce presents in this work, we can more easily glean something from the note Peirce makes after providing these genealogies: "The development ... of thought should, if it exists, be distinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the development of an idea." Here we see a type of circularity emerge in the structure of thought's purpose. It is, however, not a vicious, but a hermeneutic, or pragmatic circularity. The purpose of thought is to develop ever-more-refined thoughts that, in turn, substantiate ever-deeper feelings of continuity and mediation. "We should have a direct agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition of it (this purpose) by virtue of the continuity of thought."

From Parmenides, to Aristotle, to Scotus, to Kant — Peirce's works reflect an intimate familiarity with the history of philosophy. Indeed, he has the uncanny ability to expose the common ground between various, and often antagonistic, thinkers. His treatment of the genealogy of philosophy both recognizes the similarities and preserves the discrepancies between moments of inquiry. Peirce himself usually acknowledges the lineage of inquirers that cleared the way for — and directed — his own freedom of thought. He is, after all, just another embodied moment of the abductive process he seeks to describe. In examining Kant's *Critique of Judgment* in relation to the epistemological and ontological stances that Peirce assumes, I have aimed to deepen the sense of continuity between Peirce and Kant who are usually held apart by commentators who concentrate on the concepts developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I have also aimed to identify lacunae in Peirce's own reading of the history of philosophy — a fertile area developed by Kant that Peirce seems to have neglected. Such neglect leads Peirce and contemporary scholars astray; they dismiss Kant as being "strictly modern," as being "anti-pragmatic." While the current project cannot afford it ample time, I believe an investigation of Kant's lesser works such as the *Anthropology* will yield similar mediating results. It will both shed light on the unacknowledged inheritance that Kant offers pragmatism and expose a genuine continuity between the freedom of American thought and the constraints of the historical tradition.

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NOTES
2. CP 1.300.
6. 5.452.
14. CP 1.35.
15. CP 1.39.
16. CP 3.560.
17. CP 5.177.
18. CP 6.120.
20. CP 6.203.
22. CPR A138.
23. CPR A138.
24. Italics mine CPR A78.
25. CPR A147.
26. Italics mine CPR A15.
27. CP 1.46.
28. CP 1.35.
30. CPR A 130.
31. Martin Heidegger’s lectures on the First Critique seem to provide an
alternative reading in which imagination gives rise to the very possibility of transcendental apperception, that is to say, the preconditions of sense and understanding. It is in this sense that "the pure power of the imagination is the ground of the possibility of all knowledge...Synthesis of the power of imagination is before (vor) apperception." (As cited in Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 279).

This reading is admittedly unique and stands against the majority of Kant scholarship. Heidegger's interpretation of Kantian imagination, however, seems extremely interesting in his subsequent suggestion that the mediating character of imagination reflects the undifferentiated continuity of time that underpins all of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This comment on imagination provides a point of contact between Peircean continuity and Kantian imagination and does so in terms of Kant's earlier works. This argument turns on Kant's use of language (the use of vor) and requires a detailed exposition that cannot be afforded at this time.

32. Peirce writes: "Kant is a nominalist." Likewise, he asserts that the whole of modern philosophy suffers from the same philosophic deficiency. CP 1.19.

33. CP 1.384.

34. CP 8.30.


41. CJ 15.

42. CJ 22.

43. CJ 9.


49. (para. mine) CJ 294-295.

50. CJ 307.

in *Essays in Kant's Aesthetic*. P. 301.

52. CJ 308.
53. CJ 317.
55. (Italics mine) CJ 317.
57. CP 2.197.
59. CP 6.459.
60. CP 2.101.
61. CP 2.270.
62. CP 5.494.
63. CP 7.219.
64. CP 6.526.
65. CP 5.171.
66. CP 6.10.
67. CP 1.383.
68. CP 5.604.
69. (Italics mine) CP 1.473.
70. CP 6.104.
71. Interestingly, Peirce's discussion of the sheet of assertion and the way that existential “cuts” both limit and create new fields of possibility often reflects the evolutionary story told here in terms of the movement of inquiry.
72. CP 6.315.

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